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Abstract
 This paper examines the various features of major Japanese companies and Japan’s 
corporate governance in the interwar period from about 1920 to 1940. It also investigates 
the establishment background of present corporate governance.
 First, representative companies (except for banks) are discussed in Section 1 and 
representative banks in Section 2. Of those companies and banks, I select salient 
examples and analyze those businesses and their entire ﬁnancial information in great 
detail in Section 3. I explore their securities investments concerning further restricted 
companies in Section 4. I examine the entire ﬁnancial and securities market during that 
time in Section 5. Section 6 approaches the actual condition and role of the life insurance 
company as an institutional investor. The life insurance company’s investments made a 
positive impact on companies and banks at the time through the ﬁnancial and securities 
market.
 Current Japanese corporate governance is often characterized as an insider type 
of corporate governance. The origin of such corporate governance, or today’s business 
group, was often believed to result from past Japanese zaibatsu rule.
 However, the analysis in this paper shows that the ﬁnancial and securities market 
had a very large role in raising and managing capital for major companies and 
banks in the interwar period. In this meaning, Japanese corporate governance in the 
interwar period was market-centered and very similar to those of the U.S. and Britain 
today. Such a feature was remarkable in the emerging zaibatsu and the independent 
companies. The vertical and integrated control and controlled relations made the holding 
company reach the top were formed in major zaibatsu is certain. Even in this case, the 
market’s role was not small, and the governance in major zaibatsu was never dominant. 
 
＊1   I presented this paper in International Federation of Scholarly Associations of Management 
(IFSAM) VIIIth World Congress 2006, on September 28-30, 2006. My title of this 
presentation was Market Centered Corporate Governance in Prewar Japan and Today.
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Moreover, regarding the macro capital ﬂow, the role of securities, not bank deposits, was 
remarkably important. 
 The development of such market-centered corporate governance was one of the 
most important factors that supported active Japanese foreign investment in the prewar 
period and brought about economic development, as my another paper will examine.
Keywords: Market-centered Corporate Governance, Main Bank System, Financial and 
Securities Markets, Holding Company, Insurance Company  
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Introduction
 Both at home and abroad, there seems to be a signiﬁcant misunderstanding about 
corporate governance in prewar Japan. During the prewar period, Japanese corporate 
governance, like U.S. corporate governance, was market-centered. Such a market-
centered system supported the rapid growth of the Japanese economy. I would like to 
explain this based on fundamental data such as an account of business.
 At last, the Japanese economy is now escaping from the Lost Decade, and seems to 
be correcting itself toward a path of growth. Japanese corporate governance, called the 
Main Bank System, is changing into a market-centered system. This market-centered 
system is playing an important role for new economic recovery.
 This process is being brought about by both the economic globalization through the 
IT revolution and an examination of past experiences.
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1  Representative Japanese Companies in the Interwar Period
 In Section 1, I would like to examine the features of representative Japanese 
companies in the interwar period, chieﬂy in 1930. 
 When we investigate zaibatsu and business groups, if we examine only related 
companies and their ﬁnancial relationships, it is possible to overevaluate their inﬂuence.
 In the following 3 tables, I would like to consider major companies in order of assets 
and the total of the top thirty companies, looking at assets, paid-up capital, number of 
issued shares, number of stockholders, shares per shareholder, three large stockholders, 
and top 5 stockholders totals using data from “the Account of Business Collection 
(microﬁlm)”＊2 and some publications. For ﬁscal years 1920 and 1940, I show only data of 
the top ten companies and the total for the top thirty companies. ＊3
 The basic data of corporate activity, such as an account of business, which I often 
make use of in this book, were published early in the history of each company, by each 
company. This shows that information disclosure by company has developed remarkably. 
The fact that various investment books were published during this period suggests that 
the strata of investors during the period were wide. Such conditions also supported 
Japanese economic growth during the prewar period.
1.1  Representative Japanese Companies in 1920
 To begin this paper, I will examine the condition of Japan’s economy in 1920, which 
marked the immediate end of World War I in Table 1. After the Meiji Restoration, 
Japan had attained rapid economic growth, and its role in the world economy was 
becoming signiﬁcant after it, emerged as a victorious country from World War I.
 At that time in Japan, full-scale industrialization had just started, and the major 
exports were fibers, such as raw silk and cotton yarn, and textiles, such as silk and 
cotton. The balance of trade was also still experiencing a deﬁcit. Japan was beginning to 
engage in capital exports; however, the amount of those exports was small. ＊4
 When we compare representative companies of the 1920s with those in the 1930s, 
 
＊2   Yushodo Shuppan (various years).
＊3   Regarding detailed data in each following table, refer to Shimpo (2006).
＊4   Shimpo (1998, 30-32, 54-55). Regarding Japanese FDI in the interwar period, we have no 
comprehensive, correct estimate at the moment.
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we can see the diﬀerence by industrial composition. Of the top 30 companies in 1920, 14 
of those companies, almost half, were no longer in the top 30 by 1930. We can ﬁnd this 
big change over ten years. Four of these companies, including Nippon Cotton, belonged 
to the spinning industry, and three companies, including Toyo Sugar Manufacturing, 
belonged to the sugar manufacturing industry. The representative Japanese companies 
were changing from labor-intensive or resource processing companies to capital-
intensive or technology-intensive companies in the period of the 1920s.
 Next, I will show each company’s characteristics, which can be clearly seen from 
the viewpoint of the stockholding ratios of major stockholders. First, we notice South 
Manchuria Railway (established in 1906), which was a state-owned enterprise. Its assets 
were three times greater than those of Nippon Yusen, the second largest company. 
South Manchuria Railway was consistently the largest company in Japan until World 
War II. The fact that it was the largest company for such a long time shows that 
Manchurian development played a signiﬁcant role in the Japanese economy.
 The Department of the Imperial Household owned 18.1% of Nippon Yusen’s equities. 
The Department of the Imperial Household was the largest shareholder of Nippon Yusen, 
the second largest shareholder of Toyo Takushoku, and the third largest shareholder of 
Taiwan Sugar Manufacturing. The Department of the Imperial Household owned a broad 
range of equities of leading companies. ＊5 In 1930, Nippon Yusen’s position declined. The 
Department of the Imperial Household’s shareholding ratio of Nippon Yusen also quickly 
declined.
 There were three major Mitsui Zaibatsu companies: Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship, 
Oji Paper, and Nippon Steel Works. Mitsubishi Mining was only one company of 
Mitsubishi Zaibatsu. In terms of other zaibatsu companies, Kawasaki Shipyard and 
Kokusai Steamship organized a group, and there was one company each of Asano 
Zaibatsu and Suzuki Zaibatsu, etc. Kuhara Mining was one company of Kuhara Zaibatsu 
(The name was changed to Nippon Sangyo in 1928). Of these companies, Kokusai 
Steamship and Nippon Steel Works had very few stockholders.
 Finally, we should notice that there were many individual leading investors in each 
case. Of the 150 stockholders, though there are duplicates, about one-third was individual 
leading investors. There were a number of companies in which individuals and their 
families took the lead, often as a general partnership and a limited partnership. In 
 
＊5   In the case of Toyo Takushoku, Taiwan Sugar Manufacturing, etc., the Department of the 
Imperial Household is indicated as the Uchikura-no-kami.
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contrast, the number of banks was only nine, including small-scale ones.
1.2  Representative Japanese Companies in 1930
 Until 1929, the world economy developed favorably, and the entire world enjoyed the 
results of such growth. The sudden fall of stock prices at the New York Stock Exchange 
marked the beginning of the Great Depression, and a lengthy period of world economic 
stagnation began in October of the same year. The year 1930 in Table 2 shows the 
summit of the economy during the interwar period.
 When the top thirty companies are classified by industry, the biggest industry 
is electric light and electric power, which comprises seven of the companies, such 
as Tokyo Electric Light. Five companies in this industry are in the top ten. In the 
railroad and railway industry, there are three companies listed, including South 
Manchuria Railway, the largest corporation. Two trading companies, Mitsui & Co. and 
Mitsubishi Trading, follow. We can argue that the electric power industry and the 
railway industry, which together formed the economic infrastructure, led the economy. 
At this point, the major companies in the textile and other industries in 1920, had been, 
drastically replaced.
 The representative companies in the electric light and power industry in 1930 
were independent companies that did not belong to the major zaibatsu. The largest 
stockholder of Tokyo Electric Light was Toden Securities, the latter was founded in 
1927 as “the holding company developed early in the U.S. and was imitated in Japan” 
(Tokyo Electric Light, 1936, 193-94). Similar situations can be found in other electric 
power industry companies. Moreover, Toho Electric Power owned the equity in Tokyo 
Electric Light. Toho Electric Power became the largest stockholder of Godo Electricity, 
and the Toho Electric Power group was formed. In this way, mutual relationships in the 
same industry were strengthened. The alliance between the electric light and power 
companies and the railroad and railway companies, the latter a huge consumer of the 
former, was very close. Keihan Electric Railway was the largest stockholder of Daido 
Electric Power, and the second largest stockholder of Godo Electricity.
 It is noteworthy that the average amount of shares per shareholder in these electric 
light and electric power companies was about a hundred shares during this period. 
The dispersion of stockholding had progressed markedly. The ﬁnancial and securities 
markets in the interwar period showed rapid growth, and allowed these companies to 
develop further on the basis of this growth.
 In comparison, there were three Mitsui Zaibatsu companies as in 1920, and three 
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Mitsubishi Zaibatsu companies increased by two. One of the Mitsui Zaibatsu companies, 
Mitsui & Co. appeared as the third largest corporation in the list, and its stockholders 
were only the Mitsui family excluding Mitsui Gomei, the largest stockholder. There were 
only thirty-one stockholders, so it was a remarkably closed corporation. The Mitsubishi 
Zaibatsu companies, Mitsubishi Trading and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, entered the list, 
and the inﬂuence of Mitsubishi companies gradually increased. Mitsubishi Goshi owned 
most of the Mitsubishi Trading and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding stock. Other stockholders 
were either Mitsubishi related companies or Mitsubishi family investors, making these 
companies de facto closed companies. The three Mitsubishi companies had the same 
structure that we now observe as similar cross-shareholding amongst current leading 
Japanese companies. As zaibatsu companies, there were Asano Cement and Nippon 
Nitrogen Fertilizer, ＊6 the latter were classified into the same emerging zaibatsu as 
Nippon Sangyo.
 As is well known, Prof. Hidemasa Morikawa defines Zaibatsu as “a diversified 
business based on blocked holding and control by millionaire’s family and relatives.” 
According to this deﬁnition, the emerging zaibatsu with dispersed stock ownership is 
very diﬀerent from traditional zaibatsu.
 The influence of major zaibatsu companies gradually increased, however it is 
important to understand that the electric light and electric power companies led the 
economy, with the contrasting characteristics of stockholding and means of ﬁnancing. 
The competition between these companies characterized this period.
 Next, the appearance of insurance companies as institutional investors was important. 
Since I discuss this in detail in Section 6, I would like to brieﬂy mention this issue here.
 In 1920, there was only one insurance company as a stockholder, Yokohama Life 
Insurance. By 1930, there were twelve such companies and, among them, Dai-ichi Mutual 
Life Insurance owned the equities of five companies. In contrast, there were forty-
six leading individual investors (duplications are included). In that year, however, four 
Mitsui family investors in Mitsui & Co., diﬀerent from the general individual investors, 
were included. If they are excluded, we can conclude that the ratio of leading individual 
investors was slightly reduced when compared with 1920.
 From this period, institutionalization in which the role of institutional investors 
increased in the ﬁnancial and securities markets, was also found in Japan.
 
＊6   This company is named as Nippon Chisso Hiryo in the website of Chisso Corporation.
 http://www.chisso.co.jp/english/company/time_line.html.
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1.3  Representative Japanese Companies in 1940
 Over the long period of the 1930s, the world economy fell into a serious recession. To 
achieve a breakthrough, a blocking policy was promoted, primarily by the major powers. 
 Japan adopted the same policy, left the League of Nations in 1933, and began its 
advance into World War II. The year 1940 was the eve of Japan’s entrance into war 
with the U.S., which led a worldwide coalition. 
 Through this process, heavy and chemical industrialization was cooperatively 
promoted in Japan. Initially, exports were mainly composed of ﬁber and textiles. Exports 
of metal, metal-based products, and machines increased, and capital was also exported 
chieﬂy in speciﬁed controlled areas (Shimpo, 1998, 55).
 Consequently, 16 of the top 30 companies in the list of 1930 (including two companies 
whose names had changed) were excluded from the list of top companies in 1940. 
Representative companies also completely changed in 1940. We can conclude that there 
was a dramatic shift in companies over these 20 years.
 First, we should focus on the appearance of state-owned enterprises, which include 
many National Policy Corporations in Table 3. South Manchuria Railway＊7 was still the 
largest company, and Nippon Steel’s (established in 1934) and North China Development’
s (established in 1938) rank suddenly improved. South Manchuria Railway invested not 
only in North China Development, but also in Showa Steel Works (established in 1929), 
which belonged to the Manchuria Heavy Industry group and Manchurian company 
Manchuria Electricity (established in 1934). South Manchuria Railway was the core 
company that was responsible for Manchurian development. ＊8 None of these companies 
were on the 1930 list.
 Next, in 1937, Manchuria Heavy Industry Development reorganized Nippon Sangyo 
which Mr. Yoshisuke Aikawa was in command. It was established as a business 
corporation in which the Manchukuo government invested 50%, with the head office 
 
＊7  The list of affiliated companies of South Manchuria Railway (the end of March 1941), 
Manchuria Heavy Industry Development (September 1, 1941), North China Development 
(the end of March 1941), Toyo Takushoku (the end of March 1941) and Nippon Nitrogen 
Fertilizer (April 1, 1941) is reported in (1955).
＊8  Regarding the history of each company, refer its web sites and Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha 
(1955), Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (1995).
  In particular, when detailed aﬃrmation of facts and detailed examination are required, I 
refer to the company history of each company, which is basic data. Regarding Manchuria 
companies, refer to Sunaga (2002).
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in Manchuria. The huge new zaibatsu, which made Manchuria Heavy Industry 
Development a core, set Hitachi (established in 1920), Nippon Mining (established in 
1929), and Showa Steel Works under its inﬂuence. Not all of these companies were on 
the 1930 list. In this way, South Manchuria Railway and Manchuria Heavy Industry 
Development, etc. became symbols of Japanese companies at that time and promoted 
Manchurian development.
 A big change occurred among the major zaibatsu companies. This change was 
the reversal of two zaibatsu due to the increase in the Mitsubishi companies and the 
decline of the Mitsui companies. The positions of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (the name 
was changed from the former Mitsubishi Shipbuilding in 1934) and Mitsubishi Trading 
abruptly rose, and the holding company Mitsubishi-sha newly joined. With the exception 
of Mitsubishi-sha, the three companies were typical zaibatsu companies in which 
Mitsubishi-sha’s shareholding ratio exceeded 40%. Alternatively, Mitsui companies were 
Mitsui & Co. and Mitsui Mining, which supported the Mitsui Zaibatsu. The original data 
for this table did not oﬀer stockholder information for these two Mitsui companies nor 
was that data clearly presented in “the Account of Business Collection.” Table 2 mentions 
Mitsui & Co.’s 1930 data, and Mitsui Mining went public in 1939. However, disclosure in 
both cases is very limited. ＊9
 Both the Mitsubishi and Mitsui companies have the blocked stockholding structure, 
and their relationships with the market were limited. Mitsui companies greatly lagged 
behind Mitsubishi companies. Sumitomo Metal Industries, one of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu, 
and NKK, one of the Asano Zaibatsu, were other zaibatsu companies.
 An enterprise that was completely different from those mentioned above was a 
noteworthy company that developed through an alliance with foreign capital. This 
company was Tokyo Shibaura Electric (Tokyo Electric and Shibaura Engineering 
merged in 1939), whose largest stockholder was I.G. Electric Company. ＊10 A large 
amount of foreign investment (foreign direct investment) could be seen in the case of 
Nippon Steel Works in 1920. However, it did not become dominant during this period. 
We could point out similar situations concerning not only foreign investment in Japanese 
companies, but also foreign currency bonds issued by Japanese companies.
 
＊9  Regarding the public oﬀering of stocks in Mitsui Mining, refer to Mitsui Archives (1994, 
620-1, 723-4).
＊10  Regarding IGE, “An 85 Years’ History of Tokyo Shibaura Electric” (1963, 183) explains, “It 
has been established as a successive business corporation of foreign trade, other activities 
and a patent right of GE.”
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 Though Japan had to introduce excellent technology and capital from foreign 
countries in an encouraging manner, Japan chose the way of a closed bloc economy that 
depended on colonies. This decision was one of the important factors that led to Japan’s 
defeat and economic dissolution.
1.4  Dispersion of Stockholding and the Appearance of Institutional Investors
 First, in the previous 3 tables, I would like to examine the changes in the holding 
shares per shareholder over three fiscal years. In 1920, it was 139; in 1930, 143; and, 
in 1940, it rose sharply to 225. Moreover, the holdings percentage of the big five 
stockholders was 29.2% in 1920, 29.1% in 1930, and this percentage rose sharply to 41.9% 
in 1940. The largest stockholder’s holdings percentage increased from 19.5% to 20.9%, 
and then signiﬁcantly to 30.1% in 1940.
 The change in these ﬁgures was due to many large companies, such as state-owned 
enterprises and major zaibatsu companies newly appearing in 1940.
 The inﬂuence of Manchuria Heavy Industry Development group was two-fold, but 
in opposing directions. On the one hand, it promoted this concentration process. On the 
other, their stocks were greatly dispersed at the same time. Manchuria Heavy Industry 
Development, as a core company, doubled its capital in March, 1938, and the Manchukuo 
government acquired half of it (Osakaya Shoten, 1941, 208-09). In the antecedent Nippon 
Sangyo in the second half of 1937, Kyoritsu Company, which was the second largest 
stockholder in 1940, was the largest stockholder, holding 140,000 shares (Osakaya Shoten, 
1938, 428-30).
 Moreover, in 1940, Manchuria Heavy Industry Development’s amount of shares per 
shareholder was 130, and it was about half of the average of thirty companies, which 
was 225. The amount of shares per shareholder of Hitachi was 109, and the amount 
of shares per shareholder of Nippon Mining was 102, remarkably low, and similar to 
Hitachi. Showa Steel Works had only two stockholders.
 In 1940, the above number rose, and the inﬂuence of big investors was strengthened. 
There were fourteen companies; almost half of the top thirty companies, whose 
numbers of shares per shareholder were less than 200. Such information shows the wide 
dispersion of stocks among shareholders.
 Next, the role of insurance companies as institutional investors became 
increasingly important in 1940. In contrast, the number of individual leading investors 
decreased sharply to thirteen, and most of the popular general partnerships and 
limited partnerships in 1920 disappeared. We can conclude from these figures that 
49（49）
Market-centered Corporate Governance in Prewar Japan and Today
institutionalization had rapidly progressed.
 Moreover, the cross shareholding between major aﬃliated companies founded in the 
postwar period was then uncommon. Mitsubishi Trading, one of the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu 
companies, and Sumitomo Metal Industries, one of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu companies, 
engaged in cross shareholding, but they were exceptions. After the war, state-owned 
enterprises and the Manchuria Heavy Industry Development group were dissolved, and 
major zaibatsu companies were revived as the core of Japanese economy, this cross 
shareholding developed. Here, we can ﬁnd the seeds of the postwar Japanese economic 
and business system.
2  Representative Japanese Banks in the Interwar Period
 Next, in Section 2, I would like to clarify the position of banks in the interwar period 
and the kind of role they played, and to compare them with the postwar Main Bank 
System.
 First, I would like to examine the basic data of the top ﬁve banks in 1930 and the 
total of the top ten banks in three periods in Table 4. The most important characteristic 
of 1930 is that major zaibatsu banks appeared simultaneously. In 1920, the only zaibatsu 
banks in the top ten banks were Mitsui Bank and Sumitomo Bank; however, in 1930, 
there were four banks, Mitsui Bank, Yasuda Bank, Sumitomo Bank, and Mitsubishi 
Bank, ranking from third to sixth. All of these banks were under the control of holding 
companies. Top five stockholders totals ratio was over 50% in the zaibatsu banks, 
excluding Yasuda Bank, which had 45.8% of the minimum. Consequently, the ratio of ﬁve 
big stockholders in the top ten banks was 23.2% in 1920, and this rose to 30.0% by 1930. 
Since the ratio of the ﬁve big stockholders was almost equivalent to 29.4 % in 1940, we 
can observe the biggest change in 1930. For banks in 1930, when compared with the 
previously examined non-bank companies, the position of zaibatsu banks that ranked 
higher was signiﬁcant.
 For bank stockholders, the shares per shareholder in the top ten banks was 147, 
125 and 136, respectively, and there was no significant change during the three 
ﬁscal years. This is the same level for companies in 1920 and 1930. There were no 
abrupt rises in 1940. The change does not correspond to the change in the ﬁve big 
shareholders’ ratio.
 As we can see, stockholding in banks, very much like the case of companies, became 
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noticeably dispersed.
 In 1940, there were seven instances in which insurance companies were among 
the top ﬁve stockholders of the top ten banks. For instance, there were two insurance 
companies among the top ﬁve stockholders of Yokohama Specie Bank. Although the role 
of insurance companies was increasing, it was still small when compared with non-bank 
companies. It is important to note that there were four trust companies as stockholders 
in banks in 1940.
 Nine individual leading investors appeared, and this number exceeded the number of 
insurance companies. There were twenty-two individuals in 1920. Although the number 
of individuals was sharply decreasing, this was still a signiﬁcant number. One reason 
for this would be that the paid-up capital of banks, i.e., the scale of banks, was still small 
when compared with non-ﬁnancial companies.
 The stockholding of banks by non-bank companies can hardly be seen except for 
some financial institutions, and this was a remarkable characteristic. As mentioned 
above, it was exceptional for banks to own the equities of non-bank companies. If 
there were few opposite situations, we can conclude that cross shareholding was not 
signiﬁcant at that time.
 It has become clear that banks during the interwar era did not necessarily occupy 
a core position with respect to stockholding in the whole zaibatsu. The stockholding of 
zaibatsu companies by holding companies in those days was not mutual, but vertical and 
integrated. In Section 4, I would like to examine a holding company and its stockholdings 
in detail.
3  Financial Information on Leading Companies and Banks
 In Section 3, I would like to further examine ﬁnancial information for some signiﬁcant 
companies and banks previously discussed. The asset composition and the internal 
ﬁnance of major companies and banks will be considered.
3.1  Companies with High Capital Ratios
 Table 5 shows the basic ﬁnancial information of ten representative companies and 
the total of the top thirty companies, as well as three representative banks and the total 
of the top ﬁve banks in 1930.
 The high capital ratio for non-bank companies is remarkable. The capital ratio in 
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the top thirty companies was 44.6%, excluding companies for which we are not able to 
obtain information. If unpaid capital is excluded, the capital ratio falls to 35.4%, but it is 
still high.
 The capital ratio was very high in each company except for trading companies. 
The highest was 46.8% for Tokyo Electric Light. This trend did not change in 1940. 
The highest was 54.7% for Nippon Electricity Generation and Transmission, which was 
established by the Nippon Electric Transmission Corporation Law in 1939.
 In addition, the trend that shows a very high ratio of corporate bonds to total assets 
has been added. The ratio of the total of the top thirty companies amounts to 25.1%.
 The amount of corporate bonds issued was remarkably large in South Manchuria 
Railway and Tokyo Electric Light. In the latter company, the ratio of corporate bonds to 
total assets exceeded 40%, both in 1930 and 1940.
 For corporate bonds, there is a very big difference between major zaibatsu 
Table 5: Financial Information of Representative Japanese Companies, BS, end of 1930
(million yen, %)
Debt and Capital Assets
Capital 
Account
Corporate 
Bonds
Debt 
Loans
Capital 
Stock 
Unpaid
Securities Others Total 
Assets
1 South Manchuria Railway 440 297 n.a. 53 93 742 1,116 
2 Tokyo Electric Light 407 355 35 0 10 257 869 
3 Mitsui & Co. 100 n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. 115 370 
4 Daido Electric Power 176 102 29 45 38 112 332 
5 Toho Electric Power 130 120 5 0 43 54 288 
6 Nippon Electric Power 121 105 32 14 5 80 273 
7 Kawasaki Dockyard 90 59 26 16 38 42 268 
8 Toyo Takushoku 50 180 8 15 17 132 255 
9 Ujigawa Electric Power 93 73 50 9 14 69 231 
10 Keihan Electric Railway 94 30 86 35 36 39 221 
Top 30 Company Totals 3,171 1,781 372 657 523 7,107 
44.6% 25.1% 5.2% 9.2% 7.4% 100%
Capital 
Account
Others Capital 
Stock 
Unpaid
Securities Others Total 
Assets
1 Nippon Kangyo Bank 109 Debentures 
Issued
935 24 57 987 1,312 
2 Yokohama Specie Bank 100 Deposits 564 0 354 271 1,254 
3 Mitsui Bank 100 Deposits 666 40 218 384 867 
Top 5 Bank Totals 529 3,436 141 1,084 5,119 
10.3% 100%
Source 1: Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (n.d.).
 2: Osakaya Shoten (1931).
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companies and other companies. The data of the major zaibatsu companies, Mitsui & Co., 
Mitsubishi Trading and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, were not indicated, and their amount 
would have been very small in 1930. The ﬁve major zaibatsu companies in 1940 also had 
a small amount, and the data on them are also not indicated.
 According to the above ratio, the dependence on loans in representative non-bank 
companies between the wars was very low. Many leading companies in the interwar 
period ﬁnanced capital widely, not only by going public to the ﬁnancial and securities 
markets, but also by issuing corporate bonds. Almost all capital was raised by direct 
ﬁnance. Raising funds through a market is one of the most telling characteristics that 
shows the relationship between the leading companies and the overall financial and 
securities markets.
 This trend was remarkable in the case of companies that did not belong to the 
major zaibatsu companies. For example, there were a number of examples, in 1930, 
South Manchuria Railway, a state-owned enterprise, and independent companies, Tokyo 
Electric Light, Toho Electric Power and Kawasaki Dockyard (the corporate name was 
changed to Kawasaki Heavy Industries in 1939), and, in 1940, South Manchuria Railway, 
Nippon Steel, Nippon Electricity Generation and Transmission, Tokyo Electric Light, and 
others. In spite of strong government support, state-owned enterprises tended to have 
characteristics similar to those of independent companies.
 The growth of the ﬁnancial and securities markets in the interval between the wars 
brought about rapid growth of independent companies and emerging zaibatsu, in spite of 
the need for immense investment and a considerable risk in key industries.
 Next, I would like to discuss the internal finance for major companies, the ten 
individual representative companies, and the total of the top thirty companies in 1930 as 
shown in Table 6. The internal ﬁnance is deﬁned and calculated in the following way: 
proﬁt plus depreciation expense less dividend.
 First, the ratio of proﬁt and depreciation expense to total revenue in the total of the 
top thirty companies is 15.5%. Compared with this ratio to the total revenue of about 
20% for American companies in the period between the wars, the ratio for Japanese 
companies was considerably high. The ratio in three of the top ten companies was more 
than 30%.
 One more striking fact from this table is that there were so many dividends that 
most proﬁts were made into dividends. The ratio of dividends to total revenue in the 
total of the top thirty companies amounted to 10.5%. It was signiﬁcantly high. This fact 
indicates that Japanese companies at the time were ﬁnancing a large amount of capital 
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from the stock market, and placed great importance on the shareholder return.
 The result shows that the ratio of internal finance to total revenue in the total 
of the top thirty companies is not necessarily high; however, the above-mentioned 
characteristics in Japanese companies are very interesting.
3.2  Banks with Low Loan Ratios
 The capital ratio amounts to 10.3% in the total of the top ﬁve banks in Table 5. When 
compared with non-bank companies, the ratio of banks was not high. However, when 
compared to the present level, the ratio was considerably high. The capital account in 
the table includes unpaid capital. The ratio of banks with high ratio in 1930 dropped to 
single ﬁgures. In 1940, there was a rapid fall. We can speculate about the reason: Many 
major banks in 1940 were also major zaibatsu banks, and therefore behind in external 
ﬁnancing. These conditions led to the low level of their ratios.
 Incidentally, I have mentioned that in leading non-bank companies, the dependence 
on loans was low; it was, simultaneously, the low dependence on loans in major banks. 
The loan ratio was about 40% in 1930 in four major zaibatsu banks, and in banks except 
Yokohama Specie Bank, it rose to about 50% in 1940. In the postwar period, the loan 
ratio rose to 60%.
 In contrast, investment in securities grew signiﬁcantly. As explored in detail below, 
such investments were largely national bonds and corporate bonds, not stockholding 
Table 6: Financial Information of Representative Japanese Companies, PL, end of 1930
(thousand yen, %)
Revenue Proﬁt and 
Depreciation
Dividends Internal 
Finance
1 South Manchuria Railway 188,104 30,576 22,938 7,638 
2 Tokyo Electric Light 57,449 12,869 8,143 4,726 
3 Mitsui & Co. 16,042 5,649 4,000 1,649 
4 Daido Electric Power 18,842 7,012 5,239 1,773 
5 Toho Electric Power 29,582 6,893 5,089 1,804 
6 Nippon Electric Power 13,682 5,590 3,731 1,859 
7 Kawasaki Dockyard 3,071 -5,593 0 -5,593 
8 Toyo Takushoku 8,498 947 480 467 
9 Ujigawa Electric Power 18,562 4,658 3,059 1,599 
10 Keihan Electric Railway 8,383 1,814 1,474 340 
Top 30 Company Totals 844,267 130,826 89,007 41,819 
100% 15.5% 10.5% 5.0%
Source 1: Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (n.d.).
 2: Osakaya Shoten (1931).
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to govern companies in the same zaibatsu, etc. Judging from this fact, banks did not 
represent a ﬁnancial core within zaibatsu through stockholding and loans.
4  Securities Investment by Banks and Holding Companies
 In Section 4, I would like to discuss in more detail the securities investments by 
companies holding a large number of securities. These companies, various holding 
companies and banks, are the object of examination in Table 7. First, I would like to 
point out several major holding companies: Mitsui Gomei, Mitsubishi Goshi,＊11 and Mitsui 
& Co., investing sizeable securities among Mitsui Zaibatsu companies in 1940. Next, I 
would like to look at Manchuria Heavy Industry Development (Nippon Sangyo in 1937 
as a supplement) as an example of a company of emerging zaibatsu. For banks in 1930, 
Yokohama Specie Bank and the total of the four major banks, to which Mitsui Bank was 
added in 1940.
4.1  Securities Investment by Banks
 First, as mentioned previously for banks, both Mitsubishi Bank and Yokohama 
Specie Bank whose business is impossible to compare with other banks, had many more 
securities than loans in 1930. For securities, Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsui Bank had many 
corporate bonds while Yasuda Bank and Sumitomo Bank had many national bonds.
 In 1940, loans increased rapidly in all banks except Yokohama Specie Bank, and loans 
drastically exceeded securities. This trend was remarkable in major banks.
 Non-bank companies that had increased loans also gradually continued to proliferate. 
This development meant that the growth of the ﬁnancial and securities markets began 
to gradually decline. At the same time, the relationship between leading companies in 
major zaibatsu was becoming closer.
 As the war became an international state of aﬀairs, national bond holdings by each 
bank exceeded corporate bonds. Although the relationship between leading companies 
was close, there was still little holding of company equities by banks in two ﬁscal years.
 Sanwa Bank, which made rapid progress and reached second place in 1940, had the 
 
＊11  In 1937, Mitsubishi Goshi became Mitsubishi-sha. In 1940, it changed from a privately held 
company to a publicly held one. Refer to Mitsubishi Corporation (1986, 436-43). In addition, 
refer to the History of Mitsubishi Companies Publishing Society (1981, 1324-25).
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largest amount of securities, which amounted to 1,040 million yen, a similar amount to 
loans. The breakdown of total securities was 670 million yen of national bonds, and as 
many as 290 million yen in corporate bonds; these securities holdings supported the high 
growth of Sanwa Bank.
4.2  The Bank Proﬁt Proﬁle
 In Table 8, I examine the kind of impact the balance sheet for the above banks had 
on their proﬁt.
 Table 8 shows the top three banks in order of their total assets, the total of the top 
seven banks in 1930, and the total of the top eight banks in 1940. From this table, we can 
see that the ratio of interest on loans to total income was then very low. Even in 1940, 
the ratio was 50.5%. In 1960, the ratio of interest on loans to total income was less than 
77.9%, and in 1980, the ratio was 66.1% of the total for all banks in the postwar period.
 Next, the interest on securities and dividends contributed significantly to banks 
total income. The ratio total amounted to 26.3%, 24.7% respectively in two ﬁscal years. 
This level was twice as high as the amount in the postwar period. Mitsubishi Bank in 
1930 and Sanwa Bank in 1940 all exceeded 30%; this level was exceedingly high when 
compared with other banks. The securities holdings in Mitsubishi Bank exceeded the 
amount of loans in 1930, and Sanwa Bank increased its securities the most in 1940.
 In addition, the commissions that attract attention as a new source of bank earnings 
Table 8: Financial Information of Representative Japanese Banks, second half of 1930 and 1940
(1,000 yen, total assets: million yen)
Total 
Assets
Total 
Income
Loan 
Interest
Discount Commission Interest on 
Securities 
and 
Dividends
Ratio to 
Total 
Income
Total 
Expenditures
Current 
Net 
Income
1930 Yokohama 
Specie Bank
1,254 57,163 20,670 3,401 412 n.a. n.a. 44,227 6,582 
Sumitomo 
Bank
823 31,490 12,215 2,326 232 6,288 20.0% 28,645 2,845 
Mitsui Bank 867 29,365 13,315 1,242 200 5,986 20.4% 26,721 2,643 
7 Bank Totals 4,127 134,483 57,545 7,731 1,175 35,399 117,104 17,375 
100.0% 42.8% 0.9% 26.3% 12.9%
1940 Yokohama 
Specie Bank
3,405 82,446 45,509 8,207 1,415 n.a. n.a. 63,412 19,033 
Sumitomo 
Bank
2,647 72,915 38,868 2,973 722 14,827 20.3% 67,060 5,854 
Yasuda Bank 2,663 69,981 35,129 3,943 870 15,282 21.8% 62,864 7,116 
8 Bank Totals 14,371 345,706 174,711 17,363 4,914 85,375 309,462 36,239 
100.0% 50.5% 1.4% 24.7% 10.5%
Source 1: Osakaya Shoten (1931).
 2: Osakaya Shoten (1941).
 3: Yushodo Shuppan (various years).
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today then increased in Yokohama Specie Bank and Mitsui Bank, etc., and also increased 
in all banks. This increase was brought about by an increase in corporate bonds. Of 
course, the amount of commissions did not take the lead in earnings during the interwar 
period.
 The net income ratio of the total of top banks exceeded 10% in two ﬁscal years. This 
ratio was very high. It was significant in almost all banks in 1940 as compared with 
those in 1930. However, on the whole, the ratio declined. Only the ratio of Yokohama 
Specie Bank in 1940 was particularly high at 23.1%.
4.3  The Position and Role of Banks during the Interwar Period
 Based on the above examination, I would like to summarize the position of banks 
during the interwar period, especially through a comparison with today.
 The first point is that banks operated in the fields of both loans and securities 
holdings at the same ratio. As the war plunged into a worldwide situation, the ﬁnancial 
and securities markets conversely shrank, and the center of bank business shifted to 
loan-making. This was the main characteristic of postwar banks.
 We know that the major companies were receiving fewer loans from banks. 
Therefore, we can speculate that bank loans instead were being made to smaller 
companies and individuals.
 The second point is that the most important securities were national bonds, and the 
ratio of national bond gradually increased each year. After national bonds, the second 
largest amount of securities was corporate bonds. There were few equities. The amount 
is less than in the case of insurance companies, which will be examined in Section 6. 
Considered from the perspective of non-bank companies, it was rare for banks to become 
major stockholders. Cross shareholding in the postwar period was not very signiﬁcant.
 In comparison, the Main Bank System, which became dominant after the war, had 
the following characteristics. The main bank would occupy a core position at the heart of 
mutually involved companies, and would be involved in making loans, cross shareholding 
and the dispatching of officers etc., based on the conditions that the financial and 
securities markets lagged behind. The Main Bank System continuously monitored the 
whole business group instead of the market. Once a bank or company ﬂoundered, the 
main bank played the role of “Lender of last resort,” aiming at the whole business 
group’s growth.
 As discussed in the above examination, we can conclude that the whole financial 
system and banks during the interwar period did not show the characteristics applied 
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to the Main Bank System. The growth of the ﬁnancial and securities markets was more 
remarkable in the interwar period, and the activities of many companies, especially 
emerging zaibatsu and independent companies were based on it. In contrast, zaibatsu 
companies were generally behind in the approach to the market, and holding companies 
in zaibatsu played the important core role.
4.4  Securities Investment by Holding Companies
 Table 7 shows the assets of holding companies such as Mitsui Gomei which, in 1930, 
was the largest holding company, with 381 million yen, twice as large as the assets of 
Mitsubishi Goshi. A large part of the assets of Mitsui Gomei was the equities of Mitsui 
companies, including Mitsui & Co., and its stockholding of the top ﬁve companies to total 
securities reached 73.9%. The same ratio of the top ﬁve companies owned by Mitsubishi 
Goshi was 92.8%, and the concentration of top companies was remarkable.
 In 1940, the positions of Mitsubishi Zaibatsu and Mitsui Zaibatsu were reversing, and 
for the assets of the holding companies, the assets of Mitsubishi-sha were 446 million 
yen, amounting to almost about the same as Mitsui Gomei (the ﬁrst half of 1940). The 
investment by Mitsubishi-sha was widely dispersed throughout Mitsubishi companies. 
However, the investment by Mitsui Gomei was concentrated on two big Mitsui 
companies, Mitsui Mining and Mitsui & Co. ＊12 Mitsui & Co. did not own many stocks 
in 1930. In August, 1940, Mitsui Gomei merged with Mitsui & Co., and this result was 
reﬂected in its equities investments. ＊13
 Major zaibatsu holding companies, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, had the closed 
characteristics of being in the same family.
 Furthermore, going public in holding companies and leading companies under control 
of these holding companies was slow and often limited process. Both Mitsubishi and 
Mitsui companies had the typical closed stockholding structure. Their connection with 
the market was small, and, as discussed in Section 1, Mitsui companies were especially 
behind as compared with Mitsubishi companies. In the relationship between holding 
companies and other companies in zaibatsu, the relationship was vertical and integrated. 
Such a relationship became an important factor in delaying the progress of these 
 
＊12  For Mitsui Gomei stock investments, refer Kasuga (1987, 18) and Matsumoto (1979). The 
data of Mitsui Gomei are concerning the ﬁrst half of 1940.
＊13  The Mitsui & Co. 1940 data are in the business accounts, and the breakdown is equal to 
the data in Mitsui Archives (1994, 536). The results of the merger with Mitsui & Co. are 
not reﬂected in the breakdown data of Mitsui & Co. equities.
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zaibatsu in the heavy and chemical industries.
 In contrast, Manchuria Heavy Industry Development, the holding company that 
controlled many companies through stockholding, had strong inﬂuence in the overall 
economy. Nippon Sangyo, its predecessor, was an emerging holding company that 
owned the equities of Nippon Mining, Nissan Chemical Industries, Nippon Suisan, and 
Hitachi. ＊14 Manchuria Heavy Industry Development, which succeeded Nippon Sangyo, 
governed Hitachi, Nippon Mining and Showa Steel Works, as the top thirty companies, 
and simultaneously placed many Manchuria companies under its control. Manchuria 
Heavy Industry Development became the largest holding company in Japan, owning 
equities of 1,228 million yen in 1940.
 The stockholder composition of Manchuria Heavy Industry Development greatly 
diﬀered from major zaibatsu holding companies. The holding companies of Mitsubishi 
and Mitsui were closed and family-based, while Manchuria Heavy Industry Development 
was based on the financial and securities markets. This characteristic of Manchuria 
Heavy Industry Development made it possible to rapidly advance industrialization in the 
heavy and chemical industries. We must emphasize an important difference between 
this company and the major zaibatsu companies.
 Of course, in the interwar period economy, as mentioned above, independent 
companies, chiefly in the electric power industry, etc. played an important role with 
these companies. They had corporate governance based on the ﬁnancial and securities 
markets, which was diﬀerent from leading zaibatsu companies.
 Corporate governance during the interwar period, as a whole, had a plural structure: 
On one hand, there was governance through the financial and securities markets in 
emerging zaibatsu and independent companies. On the other, there was vertical and 
integrated governance by the holding companies in the major zaibatsu. Both competed 
with each other. There were also holding companies in the former case. However, even 
these companies were founded on the market; the former also widely aﬀected the latter.
 
＊14  Refer Udagawa (1982, 19-22) and Udagawa (1984, 11-12). Prof. Udagawa summarizes 
“the characteristics of the emerging zaibatsu that journalists at the time compared with 
established zaibatsu.”
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5  Survey on the Financial and Securities Markets in Prewar Japan
5.1  Survey on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
 I will advance the examination into the features of the financial and securities 
markets in prewar Japan in Section 5.
 Economic development is due to the growth of a market based on active competition. 
In particular, the development of the ﬁnancial market smoothes the growth of the whole 
market. The ﬁnancial market plays the role of lubricant. If the ﬁnancial system becomes 
unstable, restrictions to economic development surface.
 The stock exchange in Japan was founded in Tokyo and Osaka with the enactment 
and promulgation of the Stock Exchange Act, which was in proclamation No. 8 on May 
4, 1878 (Meiji 11). The chairman of the board of directors of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
said that in 1928, ﬁfty years after establishment, capital funds increased 235 times at 
the time of establishment and the stock trading value increased to approximately 10,380 
times in 1926, according to “A 50 Years’ History of the Tokyo Stock Exchange” (Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, 1928, 1-3 and the foreword). In the early stages, the rapid economic 
growth in Japan after the Meiji Restoration was based on the improvements in the 
ﬁnancial market.
 Table 9 presents the basic data on the securities listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
The total securities continued to increase from 7,600 million yen in 1920 to 30,800 million 
yen in 1937. Although there was a temporary drop, the amount increased four times in 
seventeen years.
Table 9: Fundamental Information for the Tokyo Stock Exchange
(million yen)
Total 
Securities
Stocks Bonds
Capital Number 
of Listed 
Companies
Total National 
Bonds
Foreign 
Bonds
Foreign 
Government 
Bonds
Municipal 
Bonds
Corporate 
Bonds
(number)
1920 7,643 4,851 569 2,793 1,857 222 216 498 
100% 63.5% 36.5%
1925 14,902 7,514 918 7,388 4,729 245 475 1,938 
1930 19,290 10,163 1,079 9,126 5,724 230 643 2,530 
1935 26,413 13,175 1,267 13,238 7,854 1,423 251 642 3,068 
1937 30,787 15,396 1,247 15,391 9,424 1,333 356 838 3,440 
100% 50.0% 50.0%
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange (1938, 2-7).
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 Stocks (Capital) occupied 63.5% in 1920 and dropped gradually to 50.0% in 1937, 
although the ratio was always high. In 1937, the number of listed companies was 1,247, 
about half of the current number. Since this data is made on the capital stock base, if 
it is changed to current prices as shown in Table 10, except for one period, the ratio 
becomes still higher in many cases.
 In contrast, national bonds were the biggest bond issues. The last ﬁscal year of this 
table is 1937, and if the data is extended until 1940, the eve of World War II, this volume 
increases further. Corporate bonds, which consistently maint ained the ratio of 10%, 
played an important role in ﬁnancing. Foreign bonds were introduced after 1933.
5.2  Aggregate Market Value in Stock Market and its Ratio to GNP
 Table 10 shows the same items as Table 9 at the current price ﬁrst, and compares 
the scale of the market with the economic scale of the country evaluated by GNP. The 
current price of securities could be obtained for a short period from July, 1928. This 
current price was calculated by sampling, which is diﬀerent from the present method.
 According to this table, securities at the current price were 46,200 million yen in 
1937 and about 1.5 times the volume of Table 9. When securities at the current price 
for three subsequent years were added according to “the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
Statistical Annual Report”, ＊15 since national bonds increased approximately 2.6-fold 
in three years and stocks 1.4-fold, the total amount of securities increased to 76,500 
million yen in 1940.
Table 10: Aggregate Market Value of All Japanese Securities 
(million yen, %)
GNP Ratio to GNP 
for Aggregate 
Market Value 
of Stock
Total 
Amount 
of  
Securities
Stocks Index 
(July, 
1928 = 
100)
Bonds Index 
(July, 
1928 = 
100)
Bonds
National 
Bonds
Municipal 
Bonds
Corporate 
Bonds
Foreign 
Bonds
1928.7 15,364 126.8% 31,760 19,476 100 12,284 100 4,505 1,224 4,455 2,100 
1930.12 13,062 84.8% 23,279 11,071 57 12,209 99 4,200 1,275 4,638 2,097 
13,850 79.9% 23,279 11,071 57 12,209 99 
1935.12 16,734 123.5% 39,489 20,668 106 18,821 153 8,339 2,119 4,970 3,393 
1937.12 23,426 108.5% 46,166 25,421 131 20,744 169 10,038 2,321 5,332 3,053 
1940.12 39,396 91.9% 76,503 36,215 186 40,288 328 25,632 2,558 9,580 2,518 
Source 1: Tokyo Stock Exchange (1938, 462-67).
 2: Tokyo Stock Exchange (various years).
 3: Economic Planning Agency (1965, 136-37).
 4: Ohkawa et al. (1974, 200).
 
＊15 Refer to Tokyo Stock Exchange (various years).
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 The current stock prices ﬂuctuated wildly in the market. The market value of stock 
was 19,500 million yen in July, 1928. However, the Great Depression in 1930 and 1931 
shrank the market by half, to approximately 9,800 million yen in December 1931. The 
economy as a whole, began to recover in 1932, and reached its former level in December 
1934, the aggregate market value continuing to increase every year.
 The ratio of this stock aggregate market value to GNP is particularly signiﬁcant. 
Table 10 shows that the ratio was consistently around 100%. The lowest was 78.1% 
in December 1931, in the midst of the Great Depression. The highest was 127.2% in 
December 1936.
 After World War II, almost the only time that this ratio exceeded 100% was circa 
1989, during the so-called bubble period (Shimpo, 2001, 46). The high ratio of the stock 
aggregate market value to GNP is an indispensable indicator that demonstrates the 
important role of the ﬁnancial and securities market during the interwar period.
 The present balance of bonds is shown. Since the price movement of bonds is small, 
its change is similar to the data in Table 9. By December 1930, the amount of corporate 
bonds had exceeded national bonds. This trend was a signiﬁcant as a positive ﬁnancing 
by companies. Along with the rapid increase of national bonds, they came to exceed 
corporate bonds.
5.3  Corporate Bond Market in Prewar Japan
5.3.1  Bond Issues Concentrating on two Industries
 I have already examined stock market trends in the ﬁnancial and securities market. 
In this section, I will investigate the corporate bond market. The difference in scale 
between the two markets is discussed in Section 5.1.
 A corporate bond is a bond issued by a corporation. Compared to a bank loan, a bond 
issue has the following advantages: 1. A corporation can finance long-term and fixed 
capital, and 2. A corporation with a high credit rating can take out a low cost loan.
 Ownership of stocks bestows certain rights to stockholders. These rights include the 
ability to participate in the decision making process of a corporation’s business strategy. 
Owning a corporate bond gives no such rights. Unlike a stock, a corporate bond does 
not experience intense ﬂuctuations in price. Corporate bond risk is small, and proﬁt is 
certainly expected.
 Along with stocks, corporate bonds were an important source of ﬁnancing for leading 
companies in the interwar period. I have examined in detail the fact that the proportion 
of corporate bonds was high.
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 I will examine the amount of corporate (domestic) bonds issued from 1926 to 1940. 
The total amount continually increased. It was 1,520 million yen in 1926 and by 1940, had 
reached 5,800 million yen. In terms of industry composition, railway and power utilities 
were the two major industries and together accounted for 70% of the corporate bond 
market. Enterprises in these two industries monopolized the corporate bond market. 
While accounting for the greatest part of the stock market, the manufacturing sector 
was not a signiﬁcant participant in the corporate bond market, with the exception of the 
textile industry. It issued a large amount of bonds in 1938, which was not shown in other 
years. In addition, Toyo Takushoku, which issued many bonds, was classified in the 
“others (land and building)” (Osakaya Shoten, n.d., 204-5) industry.
 As mentioned above, the non-zaibatsu and independent companies in the utilities 
industry were leading, and the proportion of zaibatsu companies was lower in 
the corporate bond market than in the stock market. These facts also show the 
characteristics of corporate governance in the interwar period.
 Based on another data, the amount of foreign currency corporate bonds exceeded 
two billion yen from 1926 to 1933. It gradually decreased after that time, amounted to 
1,680 million yen in 1940. Most of the bonds were foreign national bonds. The amount 
of foreign currency corporate bonds exceeded 400 million yen from 1928 to 1933. In 
particular, companies in the electric power industry were active in issuing bonds, and 
they were called “the period of foreign currency corporate bonds in the electric power 
industry” (Arisawa, 1995, 127-32).
5.3.2  Major Issuing Companies and Underwriting Companies
 Since bond-issuing companies were speciﬁed in the above section, I will examine the 
amount of major corporate bonds issued by four companies representing those industries 
and the underwriting companies in two years, 1930 and 1938. 
 The largest issuing company in 1930 was Tokyo Electric Light, which issued 390 
million yen in bonds. It was followed by the second biggest issuer South Manchuria 
Railway, which issued 300 million yen in bonds. Both companies differed greatly 
regarding the details of their issuance.
 The greatest issuance by Tokyo Electric Light was 70 million dollars in 1928 (the 
amount outstanding was 130 million yen), and this single issue accounted for one-third 
of its total amount of corporate bonds. The underwriting company was Guaranty Co. 
of New York. ＊16 On July 9, 1929, the Wall Street Journal reported that this issuance 
was “the greatest foreign securities placed on the New York Stock Exchange” (“An 
65（65）
Market-centered Corporate Governance in Prewar Japan and Today
80 Years’ History of Mitsui Bank”, 1957, 240). Two other bonds were issued on June 15, 
1928, one of which was issued in foreign currency as well. Toho Electric Power, which 
belonged to the same industry, shared the common characteristic of issuing mainly 
foreign currency bonds.
 Issuance of foreign bonds was restricted to issuance by the major independent 
companies. However, issuance by independent companies shows that the future growth 
of these companies was recognized internationally. At the same time, the issuance of 
foreign bonds made these companies play as active a role as possible in the international 
market. If the issue of foreign bonds, (that is, the movement toward the introduction of 
foreign capital through an alliance with foreign companies) had spread to all Japanese 
companies, this movement would have brought another engine of growth to the 
development of Japan’s economy and politics at that time.
 In contrast, in the case of South Manchuria Railway, the old foreign bonds were 
issued in pounds. However, Industrial Bank of Japan issued most of their major bonds. 
In Toyo Takushoku, two foreign bonds were the biggest as in the case of the electric 
power company.
 In 1938, due to the demand of the Manchuria development, bond issues by 
South Manchuria Railway increased rapidly and amounted to 800 million yen. The 
underwriting company was mainly Industrial Bank of Japan. It is natural that both 
companies were under the state’s inﬂuence and therefore cooperated. Industrial Bank of 
Japan, etc. also increased the amount issued for Toyo Takushoku, and the form in which 
Toyo Takushoku issued bonds signiﬁcantly changed. ＊17
 Alternatively, the increase in the amount of corporate bonds issued by the two 
electric power companies stopped. Moreover, what is important is the following; the 
foreign bonds by both companies in this list were not newly issued. Against Industrial 
Bank of Japan in the case of South Manchuria Railway, etc., private Mitsui Bank＊18 and 
the trust company Mitsui Trust, ＊19 etc. came to issue newly. The same was said of the 
 
＊16  “A 50 Years’ History of Tokyo Electric Light Co., Ltd., from Establishment” (1936, 163). 
As there is also no English company name in its account of business (the second half of 
1928), I used “An 80 Years’ History of Mitsui Bank.”
＊17  Industrial Bank of Japan was established in 1902, based on the law of Industrial Bank of 
Japan. Regarding the purpose and the circumstances of establishment, refer “A 50 Years’ 
History of Industrial Bank of Japan” (1957, 21-8).
  Regarding how many Japanese, Manchurian and Chinese corporate bonds were issued out 
of Industrial Bank of Japan’s undertaking, refer to the same book, Table 110 and 215.
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case of Toho Electric Power.
 In this way, in 1940, the commission of Industrial Bank of Japan or Mitsui Bank 
increased, and that of all banks also increased remarkably.
5.3.3  Holding of Corporate Bonds
 Who held corporate bonds? I will now examine each ﬁnancial institution’s holding.＊20
 The amount outstanding in corporate bonds increased from 1,760 million yen in 1921 
to 4,980 million yen in 1930 and then 9,330 million yen in 1940. The ﬁnancial institutions 
with the largest holdings were private and city banks, and their holding ratio also rose 
to 24.3% in 1940. The second largest institution was the Deposit Bureau, and in 1940, 
its holding ratio was 15.2%, which did not rise. The position of life insurance companies, 
along with those of private and city banks, was rising and eventually reached third 
place.
 In this way, the percentage of the entire ﬁnancial institution’s ownership share rose 
steadily from 47.8% in 1921 to 60.7% in 1930 and to 72.4% in 1940. The phenomenon of 
ownership rise by institutional investors is called institutionalization. Alternatively, the 
other ratio and the proportion of individual investors were probably large. However, 
they were declining every year.
 We can conﬁrm that the same trend, not as numerical values as a whole, but from 
the fact that the individual investors decrease in Table 1, etc. The institutionalization 
occurred without exception in the entire ﬁnancial and securities market.
6  Insurance Companies as Institutional Investors
 As the economic development of Japan progressed, people became more aﬄuent, and 
 
＊18  Underwriting business by Mitsui Bank experienced remarkable growth (“An 80 Years’ 
History of Mitsui Bank”, 446-54). In addition, Mitsui Bank played an important role as a 
trustee bank in the case of issue of foreign bonds, such as Tokyo Electric Light.
＊19  Mitsui Trust, Inc. was founded with 30 million yen of capital funds in March 1924 as the 
ﬁrst trust company in Japan based on Trust Business Law. The trust fee was 1,960 thousand 
yen, and the bond and securities in its trust account were 268.9 million yen in the second half of 
1940.
＊20  Shimura, Kaichi supervised and Bond Underwriters Association of Japan (1980). I made 
use of Bond Basic Statistics, pp.28-9 at the end of this book.
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individual ﬁnancial assets increased. People started taking out life insurance for secure 
futures. The life insurance business in Japan began with the establishment of Meiji Life 
Insurance in 1881. Teikoku Life Insurance (present Asahi Mutual Life Insurance) was 
established in 1888, and Nippon Life Insurance was established in 1889.
 In the interwar period, life insurance contracts amounted to 2,500 million yen in 1920 
and 30,380 million yen in 1940, 12.2 times greater than in 1920. Managed assets increased 
from 400 million yen in 1920 to 4,860 million yen, 12.1 times. Many insurance companies 
managed assets that ﬂowed into the ﬁnancial and securities markets.
 First, the most noteworthy characteristic of insurance company managed funds 
during the interwar period was that funds were invested primarily in securities. This 
characteristic differs significantly from investment mainly in bank loans during the 
postwar period.
 The breakdown of securities is intriguing. There were few national bonds in all 
periods, and their assets chieﬂy consisted of equities and corporate bonds. There were 
quite a number of corporate bonds in 1925 and 1930. In the latter half of the 1930s, the 
composition ratio of equities rose to 29.6% of all managed assets. This greatly surpassed 
corporate bonds and made the whole ratio of securities high. The following facts are 
very surprising: Life insurance companies that had to invest in low-risk assets invested 
about 15%, even in the ﬁrst period, and 30% of all managed funds in the stock market, 
despite there being no need for the present cross shareholding.
 Here, in Table 11, I would like to examine the characteristics of each life insurance 
company.
 Among the five major insurance companies in 1940, Nippon Life Insurance, Meiji 
Life Insurance and Teikoku Life Insurance were stock companies, and Dai-ichi Mutual 
Life Insurance and Chiyoda Mutual Life Insurance were mutual companies. A mutual 
company is a form unique to insurance companies in which the insured become staﬀ 
members who simultaneously hold the rights of a company. In 1902, Dai-ichi Mutual Life 
Insurance was established as the ﬁrst mutual company in Japan. 
 For stock companies, judging from their stockholder data, it is clear that Meiji Life 
Insurance was an insurance company of Mitsubishi Zaibatsu and Teikoku Life Insurance 
was the company of Furukawa Zaibatsu. All three top companies in 1930 were stock 
companies. However, Dai-ichi Mutual Life Insurance, a mutual company, made a great 
leap into second place in 1940.
 I would like to consider the composition of assets in each company. The ratio of 
securities in the top three companies in 1930 was 62.5%. The ratio was high when 
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compared with all the companies. About half of the ratio was corporate bonds. The ratio 
was signiﬁcantly high.
 The biggest change that lasted from 1930 to 1940 was the increase in securities 
holdings in the major insurance companies. In particular, stockholding increased rapidly, 
and in four companies excluding Nippon Life Insurance, it exceeded the amount of 
corporate bonds. Another characteristic was the increase of national bonds, approaching 
the amount of corporate bonds.
 In asset management, there is a difference in company strategies. In Nippon Life 
Insurance and Chiyoda Mutual Life Insurance, the amount of loans was the biggest, 
and the dependence on stock investment was small. The stock investment in Nippon 
Life Insurance was smaller than in national bonds. In contrast, in Dai-ichi Mutual Life 
Insurance, Meiji Life Insurance and Teikoku Life Insurance, the ratio of securities 
investment was high, and there were many stock investments among them. The stock 
investment in the three companies exceeded the stock investment in Nippon Life 
Insurance with the biggest assets.
 The above diﬀerence did not necessarily correspond to the form of company. Each 
insurance company sought various business strategies in the process of the sudden asset 
expansion.
 Table 12 shows the companies in which the five major insurance companies 
invested in 1940. According to the table, insurance companies that concentrated their 
investments in specified companies, those with a high concentration ratio of holding 
stock to the top ten companies, were Chiyoda Mutual Life Insurance (50.2%), Meiji Life 
Insurance and Teikoku Life Insurance. In particular, since Meiji Life Insurance was an 
insurance company in Mitsubishi Zaibatsu, its investment focused on the Mitsubishi 
companies. For example, the top three companies invested in were Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, Mitsubishi Mining and Mitsubishi-sha. The above-mentioned fact signals the 
characteristics of postwar insurance companies.
 Teikoku Life Insurance made wide investments, focusing on two electric power 
companies. As mentioned, there were thirty-three insurance companies among the 
ﬁve big shareholders in the top thirty companies in 1940. The company that appeared 
most frequently, i.e., in nine companies, is Teikoku Life Insurance. Dai-ichi Mutual Life 
Insurance did not concentrate investment in the top ten companies. However, it did 
concentrate investment in Kanegafuchi Spinning, becoming the biggest stockholder.
 Insurance companies were forced to manage a large amount of funds along with the 
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increase in contracts. They managed funds well in securities that were mainly composed 
of equities and corporate bonds. Insurance companies came to be positioned as the 
greatest institutional investors in the ﬁnancial and securities markets in the interwar 
period through which institutionalization rapidly progressed.
 The role of insurance companies in the financial and securities markets was 
signiﬁcant. We have to ask whether they wisely and assertively carried out monitoring 
in the management of each company. Although we need to comprehensively investigate, 
based on comparatively sufficient information on the financial and securities markets 
and the surrounding economic environment, I believe the monitoring was not suﬃciently 
performed.
 Except for insurance companies, we could not ﬁnd other institutions or organizations 
that could wisely and assertively monitor the management of each company, where 
they were independent from companies and their groups. Different from the present 
day, overseas investors did not play an important role. Many individual investors who 
had made aggressive investments in the market, performed actively in investments in 
the Manchuria Heavy Industry Development group, etc., which had both considerable 
potential for growth and high risk at the same time. Individual investors supported the 
growth of these companies. However, since individual investors were less able to collect 
data or make decisions, their major investment purpose was also restricted to obtaining 
high returns.
 It is clear from the above examination that the growth of the ﬁnancial and securities 
markets was remarkable during the interwar period. Direct financing by companies 
progressed, institutionalization of the market developed, and market-centered 
corporate governance such as the present day U.S. and British type was produced. 
We can conclude that there were very few institutions or organizations independent 
of companies that played a role in monitoring from the position of the financial and 
securities markets in some way, to protect the investor position during the interwar 
period. Such monitoring had to wait until the right conditions were generated during the 
postwar period.
7  Summary of Japanese Corporate Governance in the Prewar Period
 The corporate governance of present day Japan is often characterized as the 
continental European and Japanese type of corporate governance: the insider type 
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corporate governance. Its most important characteristic is that a company gives 
priority to the interests of stakeholders inside the company itself and its business group. 
Such priority is over the interests of general investors who invest through the ﬁnancial 
and securities markets.
 Until now, many scholars thought the origin of such corporate governance or current 
business groups was past zaibatsu.
 The following can be concluded, however, through the research accomplished for 
this paper. For leading companies and banks, on the whole, the role of the ﬁnancial and 
securities markets was significant in financing and managing money in the interwar 
period. Corporate governance during the interwar period was market-centered and very 
similar to the current U.S. and British type corporate governance. In major zaibatsu, 
a vertical and integrated relationship was formed between the governors and the 
governed, placing holding companies in the top position. Even in this case, the role of the 
market was signiﬁcant, and the type of governance in major zaibatsu was not dominant.
 Incidentally, Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) have given a very accurate account of 
historical change in the Japanese ﬁnancial system. They classify the Japanese ﬁnancial 
system from the interwar period to the present into three periods: before 1937, from 
1937 to the early 1990s, and the 21st century. They discuss that the ﬁnancial system in 
the 21st century has to be developed, not through the Main Bank System, but through 
Japan already developed before 1937.
 We need to examine from a number of perspectives why governance shifted to the 
Main Bank System in the postwar period. 
 First, we can show the full-scale intervention by the government in the financial 
and securities markets, as the war became serious, and the original role of the market 
gradually diminished. Second, as a result of defeat, the ﬁnancial and securities markets 
shrank since zaibatsu and their holding companies were dissolved, and the role of banks 
inevitably increased to resume the activities of the leading companies. The Japanese 
Main Bank System was gradually built on a ﬁrm base under the special conditions after 
the war, not inheriting the corporate governance in the interwar period.
 This conclusion has still larger signiﬁcance. The experience of prewar days in Japan 
provides an important lesson for many emerging countries that require new economic 
development. Making eﬃcient use of the Japanese experience has not necessarily led to 
the current Main Bank System having to be transferred to developing countries. Instead, 
along with the global ﬁnancial and securities markets being currently developed, there 
is the same possibility for signiﬁcant growth of corporate activity through the market as 
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happened during the interwar period.
Conclusion
 Contemporary Japanese corporate governance is undergoing a significant 
transformation. The Main Bank System, which was a strong inﬂuence in the postwar 
economy and its companies, is now losing its inﬂuence.
 First, as the harmful effects of the Main Bank System have become widely 
understood, cross shareholding has been dissolving and stockholding have been 
dispersing. Second, Japanese banks have ceased dealing with bad loans and are no 
longer functioning like a main bank. They have improved their performances in the new 
ﬁnancial world that has resulted from ﬁnancial deregulation, also known as the Japanese 
Big Bang.
 Since the beginning of 21st century, the market-centered corporate governance, which 
was once so dominant in prewar Japan, is reviving rapidly among various sectors.
 We will deﬁne the corporate governance: the problems who governs a company, for 
what kind of purpose, and by what kind of method. 
 Based on this deﬁnition, the market-centered corporate governance is deﬁned:
1. Company’s stocks are dispersed and owned widely. A company raises funds chieﬂy 
from a market.
2. A company is aiming to increase shareholder value, and returns the result to a 
stockholder, and the stakeholder inside and outside a company cooperates to realize this 
purpose.
3. The fundamental information of a company is widely disclosed to society and a 
market, and the company’s decision-making is always surveyed and monitored.
 I would like to summarize the significant factors that promote this process. First, 
IT related companies are positively ﬁnancing from the ﬁnancial and securities market. 
Major Japanese companies are dissolving cross shareholding, disclosing their information 
and increasing financing from the market. Moreover, the big wave of mergers and 
acquisitions is being brought about, for example, by the Rakuten and the Murakami 
fund, and company reorganization through the market are continuing to progress. 
Second, individual savings are shifting from bank deposits to investments funds and/or 
stocks. Third, and as a result of these trends, the market’s role continues to increase and 
a signiﬁcant recovery of the stock market is underway.
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 These above-cited three factors were also at work in the prewar Japan economy. 
Further, the two following factors are relevant today, not only in Japan, but in other 
countries.
 Fourth, the government revised the Commercial Code and related laws and urged 
companies adopt the Company with Committees. Representative companies in Japan, 
such as SONY and the Nomura Group, for example, have adopted it and reformed the 
traditional company auditors system. Finally, pension funds, such as the Pension Fund 
Association and many investment management companies, are promoting shareholder 
activism, while wisely and assertively exercising their own voting rights.
 After the lost decade of the 1990s, both inherited experiences on market-centered 
corporate governance in the prewar period and the latest conditions are bringing a new 
economic growth to Japan.
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